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Many economists and policymakers have questioned the adequacy of retirement savings for many US citizens.1 One explanation for the low savings of some 
individuals is that they cannot resist the temptation of immediate gratification.2 A 
consumer with self-control problems indulges in high consumption today while 
promising herself that she will reduce her consumption and begin saving for retire-
ment at a future date. Yet, when that future date arrives, she, again, caves in to the 
temptation of immediate gratification. Such individuals will reach an old age with 
little savings and, within a pay period, will have higher consumption immediately 
after receiving their pay.
In this paper, we provide evidence that elderly individuals with little savings suffer 
from self-control problems. We first provide a simple model of a dynamically inconsis-
tent consumer who allocates consumption over the days of a pay period. This consumer 
does not have access to a commitment device. The model predicts consumption profiles 
will decline over the month at an increasing rate. We then use data from the Continuing 
1 For a survey of this literature, see Jonathan Skinner (2008).
2 See David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman (1998).
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Heterogeneity in Intra-Monthly Consumption Patterns,  
Self-Control, and Savings at Retirement†
By Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Matthew Weinberg*
Using data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, 
this paper describes the shape of consumption profiles over the 
month for Social Security benefit recipients that have saved different 
amounts for retirement. Individuals with income mostly made up of 
Social Security and savings smooth consumption over the pay period, 
while individuals without savings consume 25 percent fewer calories 
the week before they receive checks relative to the week afterwards. 
The findings for individuals without savings, who comprise about a 
fourth of our sample, are inconsistent with the standard Life Cycle-
Permanent Income Hypothesis but are consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting. (JEL D14, E21, J26)
164 AmErICAn EConomIC JoUrnAL: EConomIC PoLICy AUgUST 2009
Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII) to study differences in the shape of con-
sumption profiles over the pay cycle for the elderly with different levels of savings.
We examine households containing an individual at least 62 years old who receives 
Social Security. While the CSFII does not contain information on pay dates, during 
the time period covered by our sample Social Security benefits are paid on the third 
of the month unless that day falls on a weekend or holiday.3 We expect more power 
from our tests when households receive a large fraction of their income on one pay 
date, thus, we focus primarily on the 41 percent of our sample for whom Social 
Security income represents at least 80 percent of annual income.4 The CSFII data 
allows us to study the difference in how consumption varies with time since checks 
were received between two groups: people with cash and savings above and below 
$5,000. We refer to these groups as savers and nonsavers, respectively. Our model 
predicts that individuals who have reached this part of the life cycle with little sav-
ings will also have higher consumption at the beginning of the pay period, relative 
to the end of the pay period. Nonsavers behave like hyperbolic discounters, while 
savers smooth their consumption over the pay period.
Individuals with less than $5,000 in savings have consumption that is 24 percent 
lower during the final few days of the pay cycle than it is during the first week. The 
people with little savings have consumption that decreases over the month even more 
dramatically when compared to the consumption of individuals with savings. Also, 
the rate of the decline in relative consumption of nonsavers is increasing over the 
Social Security payment cycle. Caloric intake falls by 11 percent more for nonsavers 
than savers over the first two weeks of the pay cycle, and by 35 percent more by the 
last three days of the pay cycle.
Not only do low savers consume less food at the end of the month, during this time 
they are also more likely to consume less than dietician prescribed amounts. We find 
that the likelihood of eating fewer calories than the prescribed recommended daily 
amount increases by 15 percent over the last ten days of the pay period.
The results in this paper complement the research of Erik Hurst (2003), who finds 
that households with food expenditures that are excessively sensitive to predictable 
income receipt also reach retirement with relatively little wealth in the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics. This paper takes the reverse approach and finds that individuals 
who reach retirement age with little savings do not smooth their consumption over 
the pay cycle after that point in the life cycle. The research of Mark Aguiar and Hurst 
(2005) also finds evidence that part of the population with little wealth is not well 
described by the Permanent Income Hypothesis. Aguiar and Hurst’s paper tests for a 
decline in food consumption and quality after retirement using CSFII data to highlight 
the distinction between expenditures and consumption. While the average household 
in the CSFII experiences no decline in the quantity or quality of food after retirement, 
households with less than $1,000 of nonpension assets did experience a drop.
Our empirical results are somewhat surprising given the pioneering research 
of Melvin Stephens, Jr. (2003). Stephens’ (2003) paper atheoretically tests for 
3 If the third day of the month falls on a weekend or holiday, benefits are paid on the first business day before 
the third.
4 Our results are robust to this threshold.
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consumption smoothing among Social Security recipients. Using Consumer 
Expenditure Survey data, he tests for pay-date effects for Social Security recipients 
across a variety of expenditure categories. He finds large spikes in total expenditures 
on the pay date, but discounts the relevance of these spikes to testing the Life Cycle-
Permanent Income Hypothesis because of the likely existence of lumpy, recurrent 
expenses that coincide with pay dates. Restricting his attention to narrower expendi-
ture categories more likely to be consumed instantaneously, he finds much smaller 
pay-date effects. We avoid the difficulties in identifying goods for which expendi-
tures track consumption, focus directly on actual measures of food consumption 
from the CSFII, and provide new evidence against consumption smoothing for a 
portion of our sample.
Our findings are difficult to explain using the standard Life Cycle-Permanent 
Income Hypothesis and exponential discounting. Robert E. Hall (1978) shows that 
exponential discounters with rational expectations, and the ability to transfer income 
from periods in which it is high to periods in which it is low, ought to have unpredict-
able changes in consumption around a linear trend. The elderly are, perhaps, the most 
likely individuals to satisfy Hall’s assumptions, particularly when forming expecta-
tions is easy because their primary source of income is paid on predictable dates in 
predictable amounts. The elderly are experienced in budgeting and, because they do 
not have much future income they might like to transfer for current consumption, are 
unlikely to face credit constraints. For these reasons, we conclude from our empiri-
cal results that individuals with low savings have short-run impatience.5
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model introduced by Edmund S. Phelps and 
Robert A. Pollak (1968) and expanded by Laibson (1998, 1997) provides a parsimo-
nious framework for modelling short-run impatience.6 Quasi-hyperbolic discounters 
discount the consumption between today and tomorrow at a higher rate than con-
sumption between adjacent days further in the future, and this generates time incon-
sistency. In laboratory and field studies of time preferences, individuals (as well as 
animals) appear to have discount rates that decrease as the time horizon increases 
(George Ainslie 1992; Robert H. Thaler and George Lowenstein 1989). In their 
survey of the literature, Shane Frederick, Lowenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue (2002) 
provide evidence that long- and short-run discount rates differ, in general, with a 
meta-analysis of discount rate estimates across studies, where choices were made 
over different time-horizons. We simulate the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model 
to show that, unlike exponential discounting, it generates consumption profiles that 
decrease at an increasing rate over the pay cycle, which is similar to those actually 
observed for the group with low savings in our data.
A growing number of papers demonstrate that individuals suffer from self-control 
problems (Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). Our paper contributes 
to this literature by linking behavior within the month to savings behavior over the 
entire life cycle, and by providing evidence that possibly not all individuals strug-
gle with self-control equally in real-world markets. Jesse M. Shapiro (2005) uses 
5 An early formulation of dynamic inconsistency is Robert H. Strotz (1955).
6 For an axiomatic model of temptation and self-control in which there is no dynamic inconsistency, see Faruk 
Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001).
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the 1989–1991 CSFII data to study consumption profiles of food stamp recipients 
and concludes that their behavior is best reconciled with quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing. He does not consider heterogeneity though, probably because to be eligible for 
food stamps individuals need to be poor. Moreover, it is unclear whether his results 
are valid for those that are not stamp recipients. Our sample, in contrast, represents 
almost half of all elderly Social Security recipients, of which only about 8 percent 
receive food stamps. Further, by focusing on the behavior of individuals older than 
62, we show that our model can explain the small accumulation of savings and high 
frequency, within the month consumption patterns.7
I. Intra-Monthly Consumption Profiles with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
In this section, we present a model of daily consumption decisions over a single 
month. On the first day of each pay period the consumer is given a fixed and certain 
amount of Social Security income, y, to finance their monthly food consumption over 
the discrete set of days t = 0, … , T. We assume Social Security is the only source of 
the consumer’s income. Consumers set y =  ∑ t=0 T   c t 0 .
Consumers maximize
 ma x{   c t 0  } u( c 0 0) + β  ∑ t=1
T
  δtu( c t 0 ),
where δ is the daily exponential discount factor, and β is the quasi-hyperbolic dis-
count factor. A consumer is quasi-hyperbolic if β < 1, and, thus, has a discount rate 
between immediate consumption and consumption in the next period of (1 − βδ)/βδ, 
and a smaller discount rate between consumption in any two future periods equal to 
(1 − δ)/δ. We model consumption decisions over the short horizon of a pay period, 
so, we set δ = 1 and consider the case of δ < 1 in the Appendix.
Social Security checks are paid at perfectly predictable times and known amounts, 
which is why there is no uncertainty in our model. These checks are not reinvested. 
Since quasi-hyperbolic discounters make dynamically inconsistent choices, con-
sumption profiles are superscripted. At time 0, the consumer “0” chooses a con-
sumption profile { c t 0 }t=1, … , T that is going to be different than the one he chooses a 
day later { c t1 }t=1, … , T .8
The Euler equations are
 t = 0 : u′( c 0 0) = βu′( c 1 0) = λ ,
 t . 0 : u′( c t 0 ) = u′( c t+1 0 ) = λ .
7 David Huffman and Matias Barenstein (2005) use UK Family Expenditure Survey data to show that expen-
ditures decline between pay periods, and conclude this is largely due to costly decision making when budgeting.
8 To derive closed form solutions, we assume that ex ante consumers do not realize the inconsistency of their 
behavior, they are “naïve.” Our theoretical results do not depend on this assumption. If consumers are “sophis-
ticated,” meaning that they are aware of their time inconsistent behavior, the drop in consumption is the same 
as it is for “naïve” individuals if utility is logarithmic (ρ = 1), and is smaller (larger) for ρ > 1 (ρ < 1) (Pollak, 
1968). In the case of ρ > 1, as in the case with uncertainty, our estimated β represents an upper bound on the true 
instantaneous discount factor.
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Assuming the felicity function u(·) is isoelastic, the Euler equations are
 t = 0 :  c 1 0 = (β)1/ρ  c 0 0,
 t > 0 :  c t 0 =  c t−1 0 =  c t−s 0 = β1/ρ  c 0 0 .
In the Appendix, we show that log consumption chosen at time t will be given by 
the expression
 log  c t t = log y0 +  t __ ρ log β +  ∑ 
s=0
 
t−1
 log (T − s)  ∑ 
s=0
 
t
 l og [1 + β1/ρ (T − s)].
The decrease in log consumption over time is given by
  
∂ log  c t t ______∂t  =  1 __ ρ log β +  −1 ________ T − t + 1 +  1 __________ T − t + β−1/ρ < 0 ,
and it is easy to verify that the consumption profile is concave if β < 1. Consumption 
becomes constant over the month as β approaches one.
Figure 1 plots log consumption over the pay period for a yearly discount factor 
of 0.97 and different values of β. Log consumption has been normalized to zero at 
time zero in order to ease the interpretation of the empirical results that are shown 
later. The benchmark exponential discounters (β = 1) have consumption that is flat 
over the pay period if δ = 1, and for smaller values of δ, have a decline that follows 
a straight line with a slope of log (δ)/ρ, where ρ is the inverse of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution.
A 20 percent drop in consumption over the pay period can be explained by any 
combination of ρ and δ that satisfies the equation −0.20 = 30 log (δ)/ρ. If the con-
sumer was not hyperbolic, she would have to be extremely impatient to explain a 20 
percent drop in consumption over a month. Specifically, the implied yearly discount 
factor, [exp (−0.2ρ/30)],365 would be 0.08 if ρ = 1, and basically zero if ρ = 4. 
Further, an extremely impatient exponential discounter would have log consumption 
that declines at a constant rate, whereas exponential discounters have consumption 
that declines at an increasing rate.
In our model, we assumed that consumers do not borrow against future income. A 
few comments are in order to justify this assumption. Though it is actually illegal to 
borrow against Social Security income, some retired Social Security benefits recipi-
ents might be able to use credit cards to finance current consumption with future 
income. However, several studies suggest that by the age of retirement a hyperbolic 
discounter would have extremely bad credit, thus making this option very expensive 
if possible. Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003) simulate that a hyperbolic dis-
counter will hold over three times as much debt as an exponential discounter even 
when faced with a higher interest rate. Because hyperbolic discounters procrastinate 
in paying off their debt, they are prone to bad credit and financial distress (Michelle 
J. White 2007).
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II. Data and Sample Restrictions
We are interested in the shape of consumption profiles over the pay period. We 
follow Aguiar and Hurst (2005), and Shapiro (2005) and focus on food consumption 
(primarily caloric intake) to avoid measurement issues associated with using expen-
diture data to test models of consumption. This is appropriate if food consumption 
is separable from other forms of consumption. For support of this assumption, see 
Emily C. Lawrance (1991).
We use data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, 1994–1996 
to explore the consumption behavior of households containing individuals that 
receive Social Security benefits and a member older than 62 years old. The CSFII is 
randomly administered by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to individuals 
over the month. During the time period covered by our data, Social Security benefits 
were paid out on the third of the month if that date was neither a holiday nor on the 
weekend, and, otherwise, on the first day prior to the third of the month that was 
not a holiday or on the weekend. Between 1994 and 1996, on average, 60 percent of 
Social Security recipients received their checks via direct deposit and would, there-
fore have access to their benefits on pay dates (Social Security Administration (SSA) 
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Figure 1. Monthly Consumption Pattern: δ = 0.97; ρ = 1
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1989–1996).9 The exogenous variation in interview date and knowledge of pay dates 
allows us to identify the effect of time elapsed since checks were received on con-
sumption. Survey respondents were asked to recall everything they ate over the last 
24 hours, and the USDA implemented procedures and prompts developed by the US 
Census Bureau’s Center for Survey Methods Research that would improve response 
accuracy (USDA 1997). Households were to be interviewed a second time between 
three and ten days after initially being interviewed. The attrition rate between the 
first and second interview is 10 percent, and 22 percent of second interview dates 
actually occurred outside the planned window of between 3 and 10 days after the 
initial interview in the CSFII, 1994–1996. For these reasons, we use only the initial 
interviews.10 We also exclude individuals who did not know if they were receiving 
Social Security benefits. The overall response rate for the first interview was 80 
percent.
The CSFII data contain observations on 12,364 households of which 2,332 receive 
Social Security benefits. This yields 3,600 first-day surveys.11 We expect more power 
from our tests when households receive a large fraction of their income on the third 
of the month. For that reason, we focus on individuals from households in which 
Social Security income makes up at least 80 percent of total income, and these indi-
viduals make up 41 percent of our sample. We estimate consumption profiles over 
the pay cycle separately for two groups of households that we call savers and nonsav-
ers. While the CSFII does not contain information on the exact amount of savings 
held by each household, it does contain the question “Consider cash, savings or 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and certificates of deposit. Do the members 
of this household have more than $5,000 of savings or cash assets at this time?” We 
classify households as savers if they answer “yes” to this question and as nonsavers 
otherwise. Fifty-four percent of our final sample has cash and savings below $5,000. 
Eighty-five percent of these households have savings below $500, and another 9 
percent have savings between $501 and $1,000. Only 5 percent of households have 
between $2,000 and $5,000 in savings. We have no information about the amount of 
savings by households that declare to have more than $5,000 in liquid assets.
We identify the shape of consumption profiles over the month under the assump-
tion of random assignment of CSFII interview date to each household. This gener-
ates exogenous variation in the duration since paychecks were received. To test that 
the interview date is exogenous, various factors that determine consumption were 
regressed on dummies d2–d5, indicating if interviews occurred two, three, four, 
or five weeks after pay was received. We test for differences in weeks in the pay 
period separately for typical monthly food expenditures, Social Security benefits, 
age, years of education, and indicators for whether a household is located in the 
Midwest, South, or West. We also test for differences in indicators for whether the 
survey respondent is in good health, has poor health, and is male, black, retired, or 
9 Between 1989 and 1992, only 51.5 percent of recipients used direct deposit, which makes the CSFII, 1989–
1992 less appropriate for our analysis because our approach depends on the exact knowledge of the pay date. 
10 Given the detailed nature of these surveys, survey fatigue may be an issue as well. Our results are qualita-
tively similar, though somewhat dampened when both interview dates are used.
11 There are more first-day surveys than households that receive Social Security because of multi-person 
households.
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receives food stamps. Table 1 presents F-tests of the null hypothesis that each of the 
coefficients on the week dummies are equal to zero, separately for savers and non-
savers. Panel C presents joint tests for the week dummies and their interaction with 
dummies indicating if the household is a saver. Under the null of randomization, we 
would expect no differences in any of the variables across weeks of the pay period.
We reject the test that the week dummies are jointly zero at the 5 percent level 
for the regional dummies indicating if the household is located in the South or the 
West and the dummy indicating the household receives food stamps. Food stamp 
recipients and individuals living in the South were more likely to be interviewed 
at the beginning of the pay cycle. One possible explanation is that the survey was 
administered at different times for each region. In our regressions, we control for 
these variables. To the extent that consumption is lower for households living in the 
South and on food stamps due to unobservables, their prevalence in the beginning of 
the month will bias our results against finding a decline in consumption over the pay 
cycle. Further, only 16 percent of the nonsavers receive food stamps, and all of our 
results are robust to excluding these households from the analysis.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for savers and nonsavers. These two groups 
are very different from each other. Savers have higher benefits than nonsavers, which 
implies that savers had higher labor earnings over their careers. Savers are also more 
likely to be in good health, male, white, and have, on average, two more years of 
education than nonsavers.
Table 1—Test for Randomization of Interview Dates
log Dummy Dummy
food log Dummy Dummy Dummy good poor
expend. benefits MW SO WE health health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Savers
F-stat 1.03 0.77 1.16 1.89 0.70 1.37 3.30
p-value 0.40 0.55 0.34 0.12 0.59 0.25 0.02
r2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346
Panel B. nonsavers
F-stat 1.84 1.18 2.15 2.60 2.73 0.45 0.18
p-value 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.77 0.95
r2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
Panel C. Savers and nonsavers joint test
F-stat 2.34 1.30 1.62 2.22 1.38 0.85 1.68
p-value 0.03 0.26 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.56 0.12
r2 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
Observations 745 745 745 745 745 745 745
notes: F-stats correspond to tests of the joint null that coefficients on the four week dummies are each zero. Panels 
A and B test for savers and nonsavers, respectively, while panel C presents joint tests. Regressions estimated on 
CSFII data restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social Security income that is at least 
80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000.
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III. Consumption over the Pay-Cycle
A. graphical Evidence
Figure 2 presents log consumption (times 100) averaged over three-day and seven-
day intervals across the pay cycle for respondents whose Social Security income 
comprised at least 80 percent of total income. The dashed lines are for nonsavers and 
the dashed/dotted lines are for savers. Ninety percent confidence bands are included. 
The nonsavers consumption decreases over the last ten days of the pay period, while 
the savers consumption remains basically constant in the three-day graph. All results 
are qualitatively similar when the sample is broadened to include households with 
Social Security income representing at least 70 percent of total income, and we show 
the robustness of our conclusion to income threshold in Section IIIC. We, next, esti-
mate local linear regressions in order to eliminate the kinks in the graphs.12 While 
the  graphical evidence conveys the main results of this paper, we use regression to 
test if the decline in consumption is statistically significant in Section IVB.
The local linear regressions are displayed in Figure 3. The apparent randomization 
of interview date over the pay cycle obviates the need to control for  determinants of 
12 See William S. Cleveland (1979).
Table 1—Test for Randomization of Interview Dates (Continued)
Dummy
Dummy Dummy Years of Dummy food
Age male black education retired stamps HH size Height
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Panel A. Savers
F-stat 1.54 0.76 1.55 0.47 0.54 0.98 1.43 1.09
p-value 0.20 0.56 0.21 0.76 0.70 0.33 0.23 0.37
r2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346
Panel B. nonsavers
F-stat 0.90 0.64 0.89 1.50 0.53 5.70 1.17 0.86
p-value 0.47 0.64 0.48 0.21 0.71 0.00 0.33 0.49
r2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
Panel C. Savers and nonsavers joint test
F-stat 1.07 0.80 1.10 1.13 0.71 4.79 1.43 1.20
p-value 0.39 0.61 0.37 0.35 0.68 0.00 0.20 0.31
r2 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.02
Observations 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745
notes: F-stats correspond to tests of the joint null that coefficients on the four week dummies are each zero. Panels 
A and B test for savers and nonsavers, respectively, while panel C presents joint tests. Regressions estimated on 
CSFII data restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social Security income that is at least 
80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000.
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consumption when estimating the shape of consumption over the pay cycle. However, 
there is a great deal of variation in caloric intake across individuals, and adjusting 
for these factors will increase the precision of our estimates. For that reason, we 
adjust the graph by plotting the component of log consumption orthogonal to factors 
that determine the level of consumption. These factors include usual monthly food 
expenditures, gender, household size, age, an age-gender interaction, self-reported 
health indicators, highest year of schooling completed (with a dummy variable for 
missing values), height, race, retirement status, a dummy indicating whether the 
respondent receives food stamps, and additional dummy variables indicating survey 
year, month, and day of week, region, typical shopping frequency, and MSA status. 
The dashed curves are for individuals with assets valued at less than $5,000, and 
the dash/dot curves are for individuals with assets of value greater than $5,000. 
Ninety percent confidence bands were constructed by block boostrapping across 
survey stratum. Throughout, we use the CSFII provided survey weights to insure our 
sample is representative of the US population.
Figure 3 demonstrates that the consumption of households with higher valued 
 liquid assets is fairly flat. In contrast, caloric intake for those with little savings is 
decreasing. Initially, caloric intake is roughly the same for low-savings individuals 
as it is for high-savings individuals, though this changes not long after they receive 
benefits. Caloric intake drops dramatically for low-savings individuals during the 
last five days of the pay cycle. For nonsavers, caloric intake is almost 20 percent 
Figure 2. Log Consumption
note: Figures are average consumption by 3- and 7-day intervals over the pay period with 90 percent confidence 
bands.
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lower than  average 30 days after pay is received. A comparison of this pattern with 
the simulated patterns in Figure 1, reveals that assuming an intertemporal rate of 
substitution of 1 and a yearly discount rate of 0.03 implies that the instantaneous 
discount factor β is close to 0.95. Reducing the intertemporal rate of substitution to 
one-fourth, so that a 10 percent rise in relative prices causes a 2 percent reduction in 
relative consumption, gives β = 0.8.
Total caloric intake falls over the pay cycle for individuals with little savings. This 
alone does not prove that consumers are failing to smooth their marginal utility of 
consumption if the content of diets changes over the pay cycle. Next, we explore how 
the content of the typical diet for savers and nonsavers changes over the  pay cycle. 
Figure 4 contains locally weighted regression plots of the incidence of eating out and 
other consumption quality measures, conditional on the log of total calories and the 
same controls used to construct Figure 3.
Aguiar and Hurst (2005) estimate an income elasticity of the incidence of eating 
out of the household of 0.16 for a sample of household heads age 45–55 years old 
and conclude that part of the luxury nature of meals eaten out of the house is due to 
their higher quality. The first panel of Figure 4 shows how the probability of eating 
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Figure 3. Log Consumption
notes: Figures are locally weighted regression plots of weighted daily average 100 × log consumption and 
weighted daily average adjusted log consumption for households with benefits that are at least 80 percent of total 
income. In the second panel, log consumption is adjusted for “usual monthly food expenditures,” gender, house-
hold size, age, age-gender interactions, self-reported health indicators, highest year of schooling, height, race, 
retirement status, and food stamp recipient, month, year, day of week, region, typical shopping frequency, and 
MSA status dummies. Ninety percent confidence intervals are constructed by block bootstrapping by survey 
stratum.
174 AmErICAn EConomIC JoUrnAL: EConomIC PoLICy AUgUST 2009
a meal out of the household changes over the pay cycle. While the incidence of din-
ing at a restaurant is nearly equal at the beginning of the pay period for savers and 
nonsavers, the gap widens substantially over the month. The likelihood of eating out 
falls by about 15 percent for nonsavers by the end of the month.
Next, we construct a quality index of food consumption in dollar terms. This is 
done by first running the regression:
(1)  log (Incomei) =  ∑ 
j=1
K
 α j log  c i j + X′i β + εi,
Table 2—Descriptive Statistics for Households with Savings 
Above and Below $5,000
Nonsavers Savers Difference
Food expenditures 233.120 347.557 −114.437
(12.149) (28.850) (26.586)
Social Security benefits 772.938 1,181.711 −408.773
(26.335) (57.516) (61.313)
Mid-West 0.220 0.378 −0.158
(0.083) (0.116) (0.066)
South 0.401 0.283 0.118
(0.104) (0.091) (0.048)
West 0.112 0.142 −0.030
(0.044) (0.066) (0.040)
Rural 0.309 0.347 −0.038
(0.106) (0.116) (0.059)
Good health 0.284 0.390 −0.105
(0.023) (0.025) (0.031)
Poor health 0.128 0.042 0.087
(0.022) (0.012) (0.025)
Age 73.090 74.738 −1.648
(0.507) (0.431) (0.719)
Male 0.273 0.418 −0.145
(0.023) (0.021) (0.034)
Black 0.204 0.020 0.185
(0.035) (0.013) (0.033)
Years of education 9.117 11.539 −2.422
(0.236) (0.280) (0.320)
Fraction retired 0.757 0.773 −0.016
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040)
Food stamps 0.172 0.003 0.169
(0.024) (0.003) (0.024)
Household size 1.675 1.750 −0.076
(0.072) (0.060) (0.089)
Height (inches) 65.068 65.997 −0.929
(0.328) (0.278) (0.419)
Observations 399 346
notes: CSFII data is restricted to households older than 62 obtaining Social Security income 
that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or check-
ing accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. 
Standard errors, along with sample size, are reported instead of standard deviations.
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where the K consumption components c j include log-saturated fat (β = −0.15; 
s.e. = 0.04), log-unsaturated fat (β = 0.15; s.e. = 0.04), log-cholesterol (β = −0.05; 
s.e. = 0.03), log-carbohydrates (β = 0.09; s.e. = 0.04), log-proteins (β = 0.10; 
s.e. = 0.05), and log-vitamins A (β = 0.00; s.e. = 0.01), B12 (β = 0.02; s.e. = 0.02), 
and C (β = 0.04; s.e. = 0.01). The X vector contains the same controls as before, 
with the exception of usual expenditures. We estimate this equation using OLS on 
all household heads at least 50 years of age. We then use the estimates  ˆ    αj to construct 
the quality index
(2)  Qualityi =  ∑ 
j=1
K
  ˆ    αj log c ji.
Because, here, we are interested in the content of a diet and not the size consump-
tion, we regress log quality on total calories along with our demographic controls. 
The locally weighted smoothed scatter plot of adjusted consumption is in the second 
panel of Figure 4. The third panel of Figure 4 contains the fraction of fat that is satu-
rated (not conditional on calories). The fourth and fifth panels contain log  cholesterol 
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
C
on
di
tio
na
l P
(e
at
in
g 
ou
t)
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
−2
0
2
4
6
C
on
di
tio
na
l l
og
 q
ua
lit
y
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
−4
−2
0
2
4
C
on
di
tio
na
l %
 s
at
ur
at
ed
 fa
t
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
C
on
di
tio
na
l l
og
 c
ho
le
st
er
ol
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
C
on
di
tio
na
l l
og
 fi
be
r
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
−10
0
10
20
30
C
on
di
tio
na
l a
ve
ra
ge
 v
ita
m
in
s/
R
D
A
0 10 20 30
Days since check arrival
Conditional log consumption over the pay period
Savers (transparent CI) and nonsavers (shaded CI)
Figure 4. Log Consumption
notes: Figures are locally weighted regression plots of daily average adjusted log consumption over the Social 
Security pay cycle for households with benefits that are at least 80 percent of total income where total log calo-
ries are controlled for along with determinants of consumption described in text. Log consumption is adjusted 
for “usual monthly food expenditures,” gender, household size, age, age-gender interactions, self-reported health 
indicators, highest year of schooling, height, race, retirement status, and food stamp recipient, month, year, day 
of week, region, typical shopping frequency, and MSA status dummies. Ninety percent confidence intervals are 
constructed by block bootstrapping by survey stratum.
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and log fiber (conditional on calories), and the sixth (final) panel of Figure 4 contains 
the average intake of vitamin A, E, C, B6, B12, thiamin, riboflavin, and niacin as a 
percentage of their recommended daily amounts (conditional on calories). Though 
the confidence bands are fairly wide, the figures imply nonsavers diets contain 
slightly more fat and cholesterol toward the end of the pay period. The quality index 
is not changing over the pay period.
The sudden drop in food consumption for the elderly without savings also has 
implications for health. Dieticians are concerned that a large number of elderly indi-
viduals are at nutritional risk. For example, Jon P. Weimer (1997) reports that, for men 
age 60 or older, caloric intake is, on average, only 80 percent of the Recommended 
Daily Amounts (RDA) issued by the National Academy of Sciences and only 73 
percent of the RDA for women in the CSFII. Further, the average caloric intake for 
people 60 years old or older is 1,953 for men and 1,488 for women in the CSFII. 
In the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1989–1991, the average 
caloric intake is 1,956 for men and 1,454 for women.
Figure 5 contains plots of the probability of consuming less than the USDA rec-
ommended consumption level for total calories. In our sample, during the first week 
of the pay period, over 80 percent of respondents do not meet their RDA, and the 
likelihood of eating fewer calories than the prescribed Recommended Daily Amount 
increases by 15 percent over the last ten days of the pay period for non savers.
B. regression Estimates
In this section, we estimate the simple model of intra-monthly consumption deci-
sions presented in Section II. We then employ regression to conduct inference and 
further explore the path of consumption over the pay cycle described graphically in 
Section IIIA.
Equation (3) gives daily consumption for a hyperbolic discounter. Assuming log-
arithmic utility (ρ = 1), log consumption log ci of household i observed ti days after 
pay was received is given by
(3) log ci = log yi0 +  ti __ 1 log β + log (T!/(T − ti)!) −  ∑ s=0 
ti
 l og [1 + β (T − s)] + εi,
where εi represents an idiosyncratic shock.13 We estimate this equation with nonlin-
ear least squares separately for savers and nonsavers, and test the null of having no 
short-run impatience (β = 1) for each group. Differences in the level of consump-
tion, that depend only on income in the model, are allowed to vary with the same 
demographics used to produce the graphs as well.14 Therefore, identification of β 
is only based on the evolution of log-consumption over the pay period. Columns 1 
and 4 of Table 4 show estimates of 1 − β. Nonsavers have β estimated at 0.94 and 
13 A normalization of ρ is needed as β and ρ are not separately identified otherwise.
14 We include usual food expenditure, gender, household size, age, an age-gender interaction, health indica-
tors, highest year of schooling completed (with a dummy variable for missing values), height, race, retirement sta-
tus, a dummy indicating whether the respondent receives food stamps, and additional dummy variables indicating 
month, year, day of the week, region, shopping frequency, and MSA status.
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 significantly different from one at the 0.05 level. Savers, instead, show a discount 
factor that is statistically indistinguishable from one at conventional levels.
Columns 2 and 5 present estimates of the exponential discounting model. In this 
model, the evolution of log consumption is linear, with slope equal to the log of the 
daily exponential discount factor:15
(4)  log ci = log yi0 + ti log (δ) + log a 1 − δ _________ 
1 − δ(T+1)/ρ  b + εi.
We estimate log (δ) and use the delta method to approximate the standard error of  ˆ    δ , 
again controlling for demographics. The estimated δ is 99.5 percent for nonsavers 
and is significantly different from one. For savers the estimate is not significantly 
different from 1.
15 The derivation of the optimal consumption path in this model holds for δ less than, but arbitrarily close to, 
one. See the Appendix for further detail.
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Figure 5. Probability of Eating Less than RDA over the Pay Period
notes: These figures are locally weighted regression plots of the probability of consumping calories less than 
recommended daily amount over the Social Security pay cycle for households with benefits that are at least 80 
percent of total income. In the second panel, log consumption is adjusted for “usual monthly food expenditures,” 
gender, household size, age, age-gender interactions, self-reported health indicators, highest year of schooling, 
height, race, retirement status, and food stamp recipient, month, year, day of week, region, typical shopping fre-
quency, and MSA status dummies. Ninety percent confidence intervals are constructed by block bootstrapping 
by survey stratum.
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In columns 3 and 6, we jointly estimate the exponential and the hyperbolic model. 
This allows us to test our hyperbolic discounting model, β < 1 and δ = 1, against 
the exponential discounting model, δ ≤ 1 and β = 1. For nonsavers, we reject the 
exponential model and accept the hyperbolic one, that is, β is significantly lower 
than one, while δ is not. For savers, instead, none of the coefficients are significantly 
different than one, which indicates perfect consumption smoothing.
Next, we run regressions of consumption on time since Social Security benefits 
were received in order to test for a drop in consumption over the pay cycle. The fol-
lowing model is fitted to the data:
(5)  log ci = α + ψfe + γnosavei +  ∑ 
t=2
5
 φ t week_ti 
 +  ∑ 
t=2
5
 π t nosavei × week_ti + X ′i  θ + εi
 ψfe = ηm + ηy + ξ d + νr  ,
where nosavei is a dummy equal to one if household i has less than $5,000 in liquid 
assets, and week_ti is a dummy equal to one if household i most recently received 
Social Security benefits t weeks ago. Xi is the same vector of household characteris-
tics used to produce the graphs. The term ψf   ˆ   e contains month effects ηm, year effects ηy , day of the week effects ξ d, and region effects νr . This specification differs from 
the adjusted local linear regression graphs in that it does not assume that Xi and ψf   ˆ   e
are orthogonal to time since benefits were received.
The OLS estimated coefficients  ˆ    φt measure the average percentage change in 
consumption common to savers and nonsavers. The estimates  ˆ    πt on the interaction 
measure the percentage change in consumption of nonsavers between the first and tth 
week after receiving pay, relative to savers. If discounting is exponential, then log-
consumption would depend linearly on time elapsed since checks were received (this 
is true even if households cannot transfer income across months), and this would 
give rise to linearly decreasing coefficients. The slope of log consumption would 
be log (δ)/ρ. For reasonable values of daily discount rates and intertemporal rates of 
substitution,16 the φt’s would be close to zero, and the πt’s would be zero. Savers and 
nonsavers would consume different levels, but the slope would always be the same. 
If, instead, the heterogeneity was in terms of δ or ρ, the slopes of the consumption 
profiles across the two groups would be different but still linear, that is, the πt’s 
would be on a straight line, as would the φt’s.
While the focus of our paper is estimating the shape of the consumption profile 
over the month, we also estimate a version of the model where the change in log 
consumption over time is restricted to be linear.
 ln ci = α + ψfe + γ × nosavei + φti + πti × nosavei + X ′i  θ + εi
 ψfe = ηm + ξd + νr ,
16 ρ is believed to be around four and typically not smaller than one.
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where here ti is the number of days since checks were received. The average daily 
percentage change in consumption common to savers and nonsavers is given by the 
coefficient φ and the average daily percentage decline in consumption of nonsavers 
relative to savers is given by π. Although the graphical evidence of Section IIIA 
reveals that the change in log consumption amongst Social Security benefits recipi-
ents does not appear to be linear, this specification makes our results comparable to 
those of Shapiro (2005). He uses this linear specification to estimate the daily per-
centage change in consumption for food stamp recipients, estimates a daily decline 
in consumption of 0.45 percent, and shows that a standard lifecycle model would 
require implausibly small annual discount factors or implausibly large intertemporal 
elasticities of substitution to explain this decline.
Table 4 contains the results of estimating the unconstrained model for various 
consumption measures. Column 1 reports the relative change in energy (total caloric 
intake) over the pay cycle. The estimates in column 1 imply that the difference in 
caloric intake between savers and nonsavers is insignificantly different from zero 
during the week immediately after checks are received, with a t-statistic on the dif-
ference of 0.56. The changes in consumption for the savers relative to their first week 
consumption are positive and insignificantly different from zero for each period. The 
consumption for nonsavers drops dramatically relative to savers, particularly during 
the final week of the pay period. During the third week, the difference increases to 
−11 percent. During the last week of the pay period this difference increases to −35 
percent (significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level).
Column (2) presents estimates from a linear probability model of eating a meal 
out of the household. During the first week of the pay period, nonsavers eat out 6 
percentage points less than savers, and, though insignificant at conventional lev-
els, this number increases in magnitude to 19 percentage points in the last week of 
the month. Column 3 presents the results for the quality index, which is basically 
Table 3—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories
Nonsavers Savers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discount
 1 − β 0.061 0.085 −0.014 0.025
(0.024)** (0.055)* (0.026) (0.059)
 1 − δ 0.005 −0.003 −0.002 −0.005
(0.003)** (0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
Observations 399 399 399 346 346 346
r2 0.214 0.210 0.214 0.214 0.210 0.214
notes: Estimated on CSFII data that is restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social 
Security income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savers are households with cash, savings or checking 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control 
for usual monthly food expenditures, gender, household size, age, an age-gender interaction, health indicators, 
highest year of schooling completed (with a dummy variable for missing values), height, race, retirement status, 
a dummy indicating whether the respondent receives food stamps, and additional dummy variables indicating 
month, day of the week, survey year, region, typical shopping frequency, and MSA status. Standard errors clus-
tered by survey stratum in parentheses. 
** Indicates a 5 percent significance of a one-sided (positive) test.
 * Indicates a 10 percent significance of a one-sided (positive) test.
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 constant over the pay period. Columns 4–7 present other measures of quality includ-
ing the fraction of fat that is saturated, cholesterol, fiber, and vitamins (conditional 
on total calories). While the point estimates suggest cholesterol intake increases at 
the end of the month, and fiber and vitamin intake decreases for nonsavers, the esti-
mates on the interaction terms are all insignificantly different from zero.
In order to conduct inference on the consumption profiles of nonsavers, the lower 
panel of Table 4 presents the implied total estimates for nonsavers ( ˆ    φt +  ˆ    πt) along 
with standard errors. Consumption is 24 percent lower during the last week of the 
Table 4—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories
log Probability log Fraction log log log
energy eating out quality saturated fat cholesterol fiber vitamins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No savings 2.76 −6.13 0.07 −0.07 8.39 −1.81 2.04
(7.03) (9.10) (2.39) (1.72) (24.47) (11.88) (9.19)
Week 2 5.85 1.24 −0.88 −0.39 7.92 −12.78 −16.84
(7.54) (8.24) (2.12) (1.55) (19.60) (9.44) (7.83)**
Week 3 8.04 8.60 0.41 −2.41 7.45 −8.39 −11.11
(7.86) (8.43) (2.07) (1.63) (15.85) (10.36) (7.16)
Week 4 6.10 −1.76 2.77 −1.56 −7.60 −5.89 −1.04
(7.12) (7.18) (2.09) (1.59) (20.89) (8.96) (6.32)
Week 5 15.10 7.78 1.16 −0.55 6.22 4.80 2.59
(9.76) (13.37) (2.80) (2.11) (20.77) (12.72) (11.06)
NS × week 2 −9.43 −2.31 −0.61 0.57 7.16 −2.30 1.38
(10.21) (10.46) (2.75) (2.20) (26.51) (13.53) (10.06)
NS × week 3 −11.35 −11.90 −3.71 2.96 8.41 −12.41 −8.03
(10.26) (10.76) (2.84) (2.04) (25.68) (17.32) (11.76)
NS × week 4 −10.73 −3.64 −3.72 2.82 14.42 −8.53 −6.28
(10.27) (9.56) (2.55) (2.08) (26.87) (14.63) (8.94)
NS × week 5 −35.20 −19.48 −2.97 1.99 21.53 −20.26 −14.30
(14.35)** (15.87) (3.73) (2.62) (30.15) (17.20) (13.44)
log energy 0.17 1.21 0.80 0.88
(0.01)*** (0.12)*** (0.07)*** (0.05)***
Observations 745 745 738 745 742 745 745
r2 0.26 0.11 0.47 0.10 0.33 0.42 0.53
Implied effect for nonsavers
Week 2 −3.58 −1.06 −1.49 0.18 15.08 −15.08 −15.46
(7.55) (6.53) (1.95) (1.50) (17.73) (9.86) (8.13)*
Week 3 −3.31 −3.30 −3.30 0.55 15.85 −20.79 −19.14
(7.64) (6.36) (1.88)* (1.30) (17.87) (13.28) (8.79)**
Week 4 −4.63 −5.40 −0.95 1.27 6.82 −14.42 −7.32
(7.78) (6.62) (1.70) (1.25) (17.92) (10.27) (8.00)
Week 5 −20.10 −11.70 −1.81 1.44 27.75 −15.45 −11.71
(8.68)** (6.25)* (2.78) (1.83) (26.37) (13.17) (7.95)
notes: Estimated on CSFII data is restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social 
Security income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control for 
the variables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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pay period relative to the first week, and this is significant at the 0.05 level. Further, 
the likelihood of eating out is 11.7 percentage points lower in the final week  relative 
to the first week for nonsavers, and this is significant at the 0.10 level. The other 
 quality measures are less precisely estimated, but tend to be decreasing over the 
month if anything.
Table 5 contains the results of estimating the linear model. Caloric intake rises by an 
insignificantly different from zero 0.26 percent per day for savers and falls by 0.70 per-
cent per day for nonsavers relative to savers on average. Taken together these estimates 
imply that caloric intake falls by 0.44 percent per day for nonsavers. This estimate of 
the daily decline in consumption for Social Security recipients with little savings is 
remarkably similar to that in Shapiro’s 2005 study of food stamp recipients. He finds 
consumption declines of 0.45 percent per day for recipients after they receive their food 
stamps. The bottom panel of Table 5 presents the implied estimate for nonsavers. The 
daily decline in consumption for nonsavers is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
C. Alternative Explanations and Additional Evidence
The results thus far demonstrate that consumption is higher immediately after Social 
Security benefits are paid than at the end of the pay cycle for nonsavers. A concern is 
that consumption is not falling because households are exhausting their budget over 
the pay cycle, but because of other determinants of consumption correlated with day 
of the month. To explore this possibility, we reestimate the model for a placebo sample 
of households in which the oldest member is not eligible for Social Security benefits. If 
Table 5—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories: Linear Model
log Probability log Fraction log log log
energy eating out quality saturated fat cholesterol fiber vitamins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time 0.26 0.13 0.08 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 0.18
(0.28) (0.30) (0.08) (0.06) (0.72) (0.33) (0.27)
Time × no savings −0.70 −0.51 −0.14 0.09 0.64 −0.49 −0.49
(0.38)* (0.38) (0.09) (0.07) (1.04) (0.53) (0.36)
No savings 2.73 −4.22 0.19 0.25 7.28 −0.80 6.10
(6.12) (7.82) (1.81) (1.37) (20.85) (9.57) (7.60)
log energy 0.17 1.21 0.80 0.87
(0.01)*** (0.12)*** (0.07)*** (0.05)***
Observations 745 745 738 745 742 745 745
r2 0.26 0.11 0.46 0.10 0.33 0.42 0.51
Implied effect for nonsavers
Time (nonsavers) −0.44 −0.38 −0.06 0.05 0.61 −0.50 −0.32
(0.27) (0.22)* (0.07) (0.04) (0.75) (0.39) (0.28)
notes: Estimated on CSFII data that is restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social 
Security income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control for 
the variables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors clustered by survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the coefficients on the week dummies are zero, then the previous results are unlikely 
to stem from day of the month effects, other than time since Social Security benefits 
were received. Table 6 contains the results for households in which the oldest member 
is between 52 and 61 years of age. Consumption does not decline over the Social 
Security pay cycle, nor does it decrease relative to the  households with savings. Table 
7 contains the results of estimating the linear model on the placebo sample, again. 
Consumption does not decline over the pay cycle.
Table 8 presents the results of estimating the unconstrained model for different 
subsamples of the data. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample for ease of 
reference. An alternative explanation for declining consumption over the month is 
intra-household competition for resources. Sixty percent of the households in our 
sample contain more than one person. Among nonhousehold head interviewees in 
our sample, 83 percent were the spouse of the head of the household, 9 percent were 
parents of the head of the household, and all but one interviewee was related in some 
way to the head of the household. Columns 2 and 3 present results from separately 
estimating the model for single- and multi-person households. Doing so significantly 
Table 6—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories for the Placebo Sample
log Probability log Fraction log log log
energy eating out quality saturated fat cholesterol fiber vitamins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No savings −10.10 −5.57 −3.23 3.70 2.30 −6.56 −10.42
(6.37) (8.76) (2.16) (1.56)** (11.91) (8.74) (6.15)*
Week 2 −3.78 3.72 0.33 0.68 −7.97 2.76 5.47
(6.87) (8.57) (1.72) (1.25) (11.44) (9.12) (6.07)
Week 3 −0.49 4.19 −0.30 −0.55 −7.32 −7.57 1.85
(6.74) (7.81) (1.61) (0.95) (9.40) (8.67) (4.90)
Week 4 7.83 8.24 −0.34 2.23 −10.03 10.17 1.86
(7.20) (7.99) (1.59) (1.53) (11.46) (7.33) (4.16)
Week 5 1.82 −9.77 1.68 3.55 −57.29 11.48 12.89
(10.56) (12.13) (3.54) (1.92)* (23.50)** (10.24) (11.40)
NS × week 2 14.07 1.07 3.36 −3.65 −13.39 16.25 9.26
(10.72) (12.98) (2.44) (2.12)* (18.65) (14.18) (7.98)
NS × week 3 21.58 −9.77 2.84 −3.24 3.39 21.52 31.46
(10.48)** (12.83) (3.13) (2.07) (19.04) (15.51) (13.40)**
NS × week 4 −2.40 −0.01 0.12 −4.90 −2.19 −15.74 3.44
(10.69) (11.12) (3.06) (2.39)** (16.47) (13.67) (10.15)
NS × week 5 23.92 47.08 4.72 −4.24 45.34 −14.78 0.20
(17.68) (23.94)* (4.53) (3.09) (38.53) (19.20) (15.13)
log energy 0.06 1.04 0.69 0.72
(0.01)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.04)***
Observations 659 659 652 659 654 659 659
r2 0.31 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.41 0.37 0.53
notes: Estimated on CSFII data that is restricted to households with individuals aged 52 to 61. Savings is defined 
as having cash, savings or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least 
$5,000. All regressions control for the variables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by 
survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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reduces the sample size, and the results are mixed for single-person households. 
While consumption does fall in the final days of the pay period for single people, 
this estimate is not precisely estimated, and an imprecisely estimated small increase 
in consumption for nonsavers relative to savers was found in the fourth week. The 
results for multi-person households are much more similar to the results from the 
full sample. In two separate questions, the CSFII asks respondents whether they 
are meal planners for their household, and whether they do the majority of food 
 shopping. If individuals were competing for food, then respondents who do the shop-
ping would have an obvious strategic advantage over those who do not do the shop-
ping. In columns 4 and 5, we find no strong differences in consumption patterns 
across these groups, casting doubt on the explanation based on uncooperative behav-
ior among household members.
Households that have little savings and heavy dependence on Social Security may 
be more susceptible to unexpected expenses than those with savings. Households 
with savings can draw down their savings and continue their usual consumption, 
while those without savings may be forced to go with little food if they are liquidity 
constrained. CSFII respondents were asked if they had enough food over the past 
three months. As long as past shocks are correlated with current shocks we can test 
the importance of uncertainty. Column 6 presents estimates of the model for the sub-
sample of respondents that did not recently run out of food, and column 7 presents 
estimates for those that did. Curiously, consumption falls dramatically for nonsavers 
who had enough food over the past three months and remains constant for nonsavers 
who did not have enough food sometime over the past three months. Consumption 
slightly rises over the month for savers who have not run out of food recently and 
falls for those who had run out. This evidence suggests that for consumers who face 
Table 7—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories for the Placebo Sample
log Probability log Fraction log log log
energy eating out quality saturated fat cholesterol fiber vitamins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time 0.31 0.26 0.02 0.10 −1.02 0.38 0.18
(0.29) (0.29) (0.07) (0.05)* (0.40)** (0.28) (0.20)
No savings −2.91 −7.00 −1.76 2.40 −8.07 9.24 −3.71
(6.86) (8.18) (2.36) (1.50) (12.25) (8.61) (5.84)
Time × no savings 0.10 0.31 0.02 −0.12 0.67 −0.81 0.09
(0.46) (0.49) (0.13) (0.09) (0.71) (0.61) (0.41)
log energy 0.06 1.04 0.70 0.72
(0.01)*** (0.08)***  (0.07)*** (0.04)***
Observations 659 659 652 659 654 659 659
r2 0.30 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.40 0.36 0.52
notes: Estimated on CSFII data is restricted to households with individuals aged 52 to 61. Savings is defined as 
having cash, savings or checking accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least 
$5,000. All regressions control for the variables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by 
survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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larger uncertainties, the precautionary motives that give rise to an increasing con-
sumption pattern dominate the present bias. It also suggests that greater vulnerabil-
ity to negative shocks does not entirely explain the shape of consumption profiles.
Alternatively, in the presence of expenditure shocks some consumers may be 
more willing to risk being subject to drastic reductions in consumption. In this case, 
the significant drop of those hit by negative shocks would drive all the results. Since 
shocks can be more easily absorbed at the beginning of the pay period than at the 
end, this model would generate heteroskedasticity with respect to elapsed time since 
check arrival. To test for heteroskedasticity, we first run a median regression. If 
the results were driven by a few outliers, the median effects would be lower. What 
we find, instead, is a significant 43 percent drop between week five and week one 
for  nonsavers compared to savers. We also can reject heteroskedasticity using the 
Breush-Pagan test (at the 28 percent level).17
17 We regress the squared residuals from the NLS regression of nonsavers on the elapsed weeks dummies. r2 
times the number of observations has a chi-squared distribution with five degrees of freedom.
Table 8—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories for Subgroups
Full sample Household size
Enough 
food
Not enough
food Meal planner
=1 >1 Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No savings 2.76 −2.74 8.27 6.67 −30.44 3.69 10.78
(7.03) (10.81) (8.43) (7.55) (13.10)** (9.17) (13.11)
Week 2 5.85 12.65 −1.34 8.49 −39.39 6.57 6.09
(7.54) (10.96) (6.72) (8.34) (16.23)** (9.24) (10.81)
Week 3 8.04 10.46 6.91 5.11 5.74 7.97 12.30
(7.86) (12.20) (10.47) (8.40) (14.76) (9.31) (12.80)
Week 4 6.10 −6.33 6.97 5.69 −4.16 10.58 −2.99
(7.12) (17.61) (8.48) (7.56) (16.59) (8.77) (9.07)
Week 5 15.10 3.42 10.66 18.35 −66.66 19.81 4.96
(9.76) (18.52) (10.63) (9.77)* (30.81)** (12.36) (14.61)
NS × week 2 −9.43 −22.81 −0.65 −18.09 38.40 −14.11 −9.17
(10.21) (13.23)* (11.86) (11.22) (21.57)* (11.90) (15.66)
NS × week 3 −11.35 −2.95 −17.66 −19.05 12.54 −10.39 −24.00
(10.26) (15.97) (12.60) (11.64) (18.43) (12.37) (17.94)
NS × week 4 −10.73 17.07 −33.63 −12.50 14.37 −11.96 −24.08
(10.27) (20.10) (15.38)** (10.88) (19.86) (12.48) (19.99)
NS × week 5 −35.20 −15.60 −36.71 −43.27 64.73 −39.09 −44.26
(14.35)** (22.34) (14.47)** (14.00)*** (35.79)* (17.43)** (23.35)*
Observations 745 304 441 569 176 523 221
r2 0.26 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.49 0.25 0.39
notes: Estimated on CSFII data is restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social 
Security income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking 
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control for 
the variables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Individuals with time preferences that display short-run impatience will want to 
procrastinate when deciding when to undertake costly activities aside from saving for 
future consumption (i.e., George A. Akerlof 1991; O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin 
1999; Stefano DellaVigna and Daniele M. Paserman 2005). We further document the 
importance of short-run impatience by estimating the shape of consumption profiles 
over the month separately for respondents with different observable indicators of pres-
ent bias. Results are reported in Table 9 and are not, in general, very precisely esti-
mated. Column 1 presents results for people who do and do not consume vitamin 
supplements. Column 2 distinguishes between smokers and nonsmokers, columns 
3 and 4 distinguished between drinkers and nondrinkers and heavy drinkers and 
non-heavy drinkers, respectively, column 5 distinguishes by whether the respondent 
currently rents their home, and column 6 distinguishes by whether the respondent 
shops more than three times per month. Taking vitamins indicates smoother consump-
tion and smoking indicates less smooth consumption, as expected. Individuals who 
shop more frequently have consumption profiles that drop while those who do not have 
smoother consumption.
Table 9—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories:  
Linear Model Using Different “Treatments.”
“Distinguishing variable”
No
supplements Smoker Drinker
Heavy
drinker
Home 
renter
Frequent 
shopper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Distinguishing variable” 3.88 17.09 −0.85 64.59 6.59 3.83
(7.90) (9.66)* (6.44) (47.26) (8.17) (10.87)
Week 2 3.85 2.54 −1.98 2.08 6.61 −1.17
(6.58) (5.75) (6.22) (5.45) (5.61) (7.67)
Week 3 5.19 3.94 −1.71 1.87 2.69 3.25
(7.35) (5.93) (6.76) (5.76) (6.52) (9.38)
Week 4 4.72 3.66 −5.17 1.62 2.46 8.91
(6.40) (5.52) (6.16) (5.50) (5.18) (10.54)
Week 5 6.50 1.99 −4.88 −3.05 −4.44 4.30
(7.86) (7.89) (7.53) (6.83) (7.83) (15.12)
DV × week 2 −5.84 −2.78 9.65 −31.70 −16.13 2.38
(11.76) (13.03) (7.37) (48.65) (10.07) (10.23)
DV × week 3 −5.46 −2.85 12.14 −16.44 0.96 −1.88
(10.41) (12.65) (9.04) (49.34) (11.59) (12.68)
DV × week 4 −6.46 −8.67 19.46 −53.53 −3.29 −12.23
(9.52) (13.21) (8.92)** (49.35) (9.90) (11.85)
DV × week 5 −23.49 −17.15 8.95 −36.01 9.60 −10.12
(12.51)* (14.99) (16.46) (49.61) (14.51) (19.57)
Observations 728 743 745 745 745 710
r2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26
notes: Estimated on CSFII data restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social Security 
income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking accounts, 
stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control for the vari-
ables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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We expect more power in identifying the response of consumption to pay when 
Social Security payments constitute a large fraction of total income, and, for that 
reason, we have restricted our sample to Social Security recipients for whom ben-
efits represent at least 80 percent of total income. Table 10 presents estimates of 
the unconstrained model with different income thresholds. Though smaller income 
thresholds increase the sample size, this is at the expense of introducing households 
into the sample that receive a lower fraction of their monthly income on the third of 
the month. The results are clear. Consumption of nonsavers in the final week of the 
Social Security benefit pay cycle is less than that of individuals with savings across 
income thresholds, and, as expected, the magnitude of the effect is smaller for lower 
income thresholds. The level of consumption also decreases over the month for non-
savers across income thresholds.
IV. Conclusions
We provide evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting among the elderly that are 
reliant upon Social Security income. Individuals with low savings have consumption 
Table 10—Consumption Over the Pay Cycle by Savings Categories 
 for Different Income Thresholds
Benefits > 0.9 inc. 0.8 inc. 0.7 inc. 0.6 inc. 0.5 inc. 0.4 inc. 0.3 inc. 0.2 inc. 0.1 inc.
log energy log energy log energy log energy log energy log energy log energy log energy log energy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No savings 4.88 2.76 1.01 −2.56 −3.40 −1.44 −2.60 −5.05 −6.71
(7.17) (7.03) (5.83) (5.38) (4.87) (4.25) (4.03) (4.19) (4.14)
Week 2 7.61 5.85 2.44 4.51 4.38 4.67 3.69 4.44 4.09
(7.56) (7.54) (6.45) (5.98) (5.49) (5.03) (4.72) (4.50) (4.30)
Week 3 9.56 8.04 8.73 7.13 6.89 8.82 9.68 8.24 5.80
(9.05) (7.86) (6.65) (5.97) (5.11) (4.35)** (4.08)** (4.22)* (3.80)
Week 4 10.31 6.10 8.44 9.13 4.95 2.10 3.21 1.39 −0.58
(7.40) (7.12) (5.93) (5.22)* (5.06) (4.25) (4.03) (4.02) (3.90)
Week 5 16.56 15.10 15.12 14.56 11.10 8.97 9.28 6.94 4.60
(8.35)* (9.76) (7.75)* (7.08)** (7.67) (8.59) (7.89) (7.64) (6.82)
NS × week 2 −12.59 −9.43 −4.43 −7.28 −5.80 −9.81 −7.93 −7.18 −7.30
(10.44) (10.21) (9.03) (8.53) (7.84) (7.50) (6.92) (6.66) (6.59)
NS × week 3 −13.19 −11.35 −11.52 −5.06 −4.49 −10.95 −8.74 −5.00 −4.88
(10.79) (10.26) (9.07) (7.63) (6.53) (6.02)* (6.16) (6.28) (5.50)
NS × week 4 −15.38 −10.73 −12.08 −8.71 −5.92 −5.71 −7.52 −4.65 −2.07
(10.02) (10.27) (9.36) (8.70) (8.34) (7.75) (7.29) (7.12) (6.69)
NS × week 5 −38.27 −35.20 −29.87 −23.68 −17.92 −15.31 −14.89 −13.57 −13.39
(12.60)*** (14.35)** (14.06)** (12.11)* (12.19) (12.48) (11.20) (10.92) (10.67)
Observations 621 745 896 1,053 1,198 1,404 1,540 1,678 1,788
r2 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22
notes: Estimated on CSFII data restricted to households with individuals older than 62 obtaining Social Security 
income that is at least 80 percent of total income. Savings is defined as having cash, savings or checking accounts, 
stocks, bonds, mutual funds and certificates of deposit worth at least $5,000. All regressions control for the vari-
ables listed in the footnote of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by survey stratum in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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profiles that decline dramatically over the month, particularly in the final week of 
the pay period. We cannot prove that individuals with savings are not quasi-hyper-
bolic discounters, even though their food consumption profiles do not decline over 
the month. Savers may have the same time preferences as nonsavers, but their greater 
wealth implies that they will not have to rely exclusively on Social Security payments 
for their food budget. Further, individuals who have saved may have knowledge of, and 
access to, commitment devices such as illiquid investments that individuals without 
savings do not (Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir 2004).
Our results reinforce the view that government transfers ought to be made at higher 
frequencies.18 More frequent issuance of paychecks would limit the  quasi-hyperbolic 
discounters ability to indulge in high current consumption at the expense of later 
consumption. With the small cost of issuing checks through direct deposit, allowing 
Social Security benefits recipients the ability to choose more frequent payments 
would result in a Pareto improvement upon the monthly schedule. This will be true 
even if the direct utility benefits are small given the small cost of sending money via 
direct deposit and the negative externalities of medical costs that may result from 
hyperbolic discounters not eating enough at the end of the month.
Appendix: Derivation of Optimal Consumption Profile
Here, we solve for the time t consumer’s consumption sequence. Assuming con-
stant relative risk averse utility, the Euler equations can be written as
 t = 0 :  c 1 0 = (βδ)1/ρ  c 0 0
 t > 0 :  c t 0 = δ1/ρ  c t−1 0 = δs/ρ  c t−s 0 = β1/ρ δt/ρ  c 0 0.
Using this expression for initially planned time t consumption in the budget con-
straint gives
 y0 =  c 0 0 c1 + (βδ)1/ρ  1 − δT/ρ ______1 − δ1/ρ d =  c 0 0 c  1 + (β1/ρ − 1) δ1/ρ − β1/ρ δ(T+1)/ρ   _____________________1 − δ1/ρ d
 and  c 0 
0 = y0  1 − δ1/ρ  _____________________ 
1 + (β1/ρ − 1)δ1/ρ − β1/ρ δ(T+1)/ρ .
Similarly, a time t consumer will set  c 0 
t = yt  1 − δ1/ρ  ________________________  
1 + (β1/ρ − 1)δ1/ρ − β1/ρ δ(T+1−t)/ρ  ,
where yt = y0 −  ∑ s=0 t−1 c s s.
18 See Shapiro (2005) and Carlos Dobkin and Steven Puller (2007).
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Setting δ = 1, the budget constraint simplifies to
  ∑ 
t=0
T
 c t 
0 = (1 + β1/ρ T) c 0 0 = y0 ,
and we get closed form solutions for  c t 
t:
  c t 
t =  y0βt/ρ  ∏ s=0 t−1   (T − s)  _______________ 
 ∏ s=0 t [ 1 + β1/ρ (T − s)] .
Taking logs gives
 log  c t 
t = log y0 +  t __ ρ logβ + log (T!/(T − t)!) −  ∑ 
s=0
 
t
 l og [1 + β1/ρ (T − s)].
In case of no hyperbolic discounting and δ < 1, log (c) is a linear function of time 
since check arrival:
 ct = y0δt/ρ  1 − δ ________ 
1 − δ(T+1)/ρ 
 log (ct) = log(y0) + t/ρ log (δ) + log a 1 − δ ________ 
1 − δ(T+1)/ρ b .
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